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Abstract
In classical physics, probabilistic or statistical knowledge has been al-
ways related to ignorance or inaccurate subjective knowledge about an
actual state of affairs. This idea has been extended to quantum me-
chanics through a completely incoherent interpretation of the Fermi-
Dirac and Bose-Einstein statistics in terms of “strange” quantum par-
ticles. This interpretation, naturalized through a widespread “way of
speaking” in the physics community, contradicts Born’s physical ac-
count of Ψ as a “probability wave” which provides statistical informa-
tion about outcomes that, in fact, cannot be interpreted in terms of
‘ignorance about an actual state of affairs’. In the present paper we
discuss how the metaphysics of actuality has played an essential role in
limiting the possibilities of understating things differently. We propose
instead a metaphysical scheme in terms of powers with definite poten-
tia which allows us to consider quantum probability in a new light,
namely, as providing objective knowledge about a potential state of
affairs.
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1 Reality, Metaphysics and Knowledge
The term “metaphysics” comprises a series of many different definitions.
The most known is the one proposed by Aristotle who defined it as a theory
of “being qua being” [Met. 1003a20], a theory about what it means or im-
plies to “be” in its different senses. Ever since, metaphysics and its problems
have remained at the center of debates in western philosophical thought. But
while for some, it is considered as a supreme form of knowledge, for others,
it remains an occupation constituted by unfruitful discussions and pseudo-
problems. One of the very first metaphysical problems is the one known by
the name of “the problem of motion”, a problem which goes back to pre-
socratic philosophy and was brought to us by Plato and Aristotle. Plato
and Aristotle created an opposition between Heraclitus, who embraced the
doctrine of permanent motion and becoming in the world; and Parmenides,
who taught the non-existence of motion and change in reality, reality being
absolutely one and determined.
“The contradicting conclusions deriving from pre-Socratic philosophy
were of a major concern to Plato and Aristotle, because they challenged
the existence of truth and certainty about the world and therefore
about the actions of human beings in it. This uncertainty had given
rise to a philosophical discipline, Sophism, that simply denied any
relation between reality and what we say about it ([45], Theaetetus,
42, 152(d,e)). Its subjectivism stems from a radical empiricism, which
holds that things are for me as I perceive them. But since reality as
we perceive it is always in a process of permanent change this implies,
as Plato points out in the Theaetetus, also the non-existence of stable,
individual things in the world.” [44, p. 164]
Metaphysics introduced the fundamental idea of acquiring knowledge of
reality and existence through a set of specific principles. One of the first
such schemes, which still today plays a major role in our understanding
of the world around us is that proposed by Aristotle through his logical
and ontological principles: the Principle of Existence (PE), the Principle of
Non-Contradiction (PNC) and the of Principle Identity (PI).
“The three fundamental principles of classical (Aristotelian) logic: the
existence of objects of knowledge, the principle of contradiction and
the principle of identity, all correspond to a fundamental aspect of
his ontology. This is exemplified in the three possible usages of the
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verb to be: existential, predicative, and identical. The Aristotelian
syllogism always starts with the affirmation of existence: something is.
The principle of contradiction then concerns the way one can speak
(predicate) validly about this existing object, i.e. about the true and
falsehood of its having properties, not about its being in existence. The
principle of identity states that the entity is identical to itself at any
moment (a=a), thus granting the stability necessary to name (identify)
it.” [44, p. 169]
Aristotle had developed a metaphysical scheme in which, through the no-
tions of actuality and potentiality, he was able to articulate both the Her-
aclitean and the Eleatic schools. On the one hand, potentiality contained
the undetermined, contradictory and non-individual realm of existence, on
the other, the mode of being of actuality was determined through the PE,
PNC and PI. Through these principles the notion of entity was capable of
unifying, of totalizing in terms of a “sameness”, creating certain stability for
knowledge to be possible. Although Aristotle claimed that Being is said in
many ways presenting at first both actual and potential realms as ontologi-
cally equivalent, from chapter 6 of book Θ of Metaphysics, he seems to place
actuality in the central axis of his architectonic, relegating potentiality to a
mere supplementary role.1
Both actuality and potentiality were part of a metaphysical represen-
tation and understood as characterizing modes of existence independent of
observation. This is the way through which metaphysical thought was able
to go beyond the hic et nunc, creating a world beyond the world, a world
of concepts and representations. Such representation or transcendent de-
scription of the world is considered by many as the origin of metaphysical
thought itself.2 And this is the reason why, as noticed by Edwin Burtt [9,
p. 224]: “[...] there is no escape from metaphysics, that is, from the final
implications of any proposition or set of propositions. The only way to avoid
becoming a metaphysician is to say nothing.”
1Aristotle argues: “We have distinguished the various senses of ‘prior’, and it is clear
that actuality is prior to potentiality. [...] For the action is the end, and the actuality
is the action. Therefore even the word ‘actuality’ is derived from ‘action’, and points to
the fulfillment.” [1050a17-1050a23] Aristotle then continues to provide arguments in this
line which show “[t]hat the good actuality is better and more valuable than the good
potentiality.” [1051a4-1051a17]
2The need of metaphysical principles in order to account for physical experience has
been beautifully exposed by Borges in a story called Funes the Memorious.
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2 Classical Physics: Actual Properties and States
of Affairs
The importance of potentiality, which was first placed by Aristotle in equal
footing to actuality as a mode of existence, was soon diminished in the his-
tory of western thought. As we have seen above, it could be argued that
the seed of this move was already present in the Aristotelian architectonic,
whose focus was clearly placed in the actual realm. The realm of potential-
ity, as a different (ontological) mode of the being was neglected becoming
not more than mere (logical) possibility, a teleological process of fulfillment.
In relation to the development of physics, the focus and preeminence was
also given to actuality. The XVII century division between res cogitans and
res extensa played in this respect an important role separating very clearly
the realms of actuality and potentiality. The philosophy which was devel-
oped after Descartes kept ‘res cogitans’ (thought) and ‘res extensa’ (entities
as acquired by the senses) as separated realms.3 As remarked by Heisenberg
[29, p. 73]: “Descartes knew the undisputable necessity of the connection,
but philosophy and natural science in the following period developed on the
basis of the polarity between the ‘res cogitans’ and the ‘res extensa’, and
natural science concentrated its interest on the ‘res extensa’.” This mate-
rialistic conception of science based itself on the main idea that extended
things exist as being definite, that is, in the actual realm of existence. With
modern science the actualist Megarian path was recovered and potentiality
dismissed as a problematic and unwanted guest. The transformation from
medieval to modern science coincides with the abolition of Aristotelian hile-
morphic metaphysical scheme —in terms of potentiality and actuality— as
the foundation of knowledge. However, the basic structure of his metaphys-
ical scheme and his logic still remained the basis for correct reasoning. As
Verelst and Coecke remark:
“Dropping Aristotelian metaphysics, while at the same time continu-
ing to use Aristotelian logic as an empty ‘reasoning apparatus’ implies
therefore loosing the possibility to account for change and motion in
whatever description of the world that is based on it. The fact that
Aristotelian logic transformed during the twentieth century into differ-
ent formal, axiomatic logical systems used in today’s philosophy and
science doesn’t really matter, because the fundamental principle, and
3While ‘res cogitans’, the soul, was related to the indefinite realm of potentiality, ‘res
extensa’, i.e. the entities as characterized by the principles of logic, related to the actual.
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therefore the fundamental ontology, remained the same ([40], p. xix).
This ‘emptied’ logic actually contains an Eleatic ontology, that allows
only for static descriptions of the world.” [44, p. 169]
It was Isaac Newton who was able to translate into a closed mathemat-
ical formalism both, the ontological presuppositions present in Aristotelian
(Eleatic) logic and the materialistic ideal of ‘res extensa’ —with actuality as
its mode of existence. In classical mechanics the representation of the state
of the physical system is given by a point in phase space Γ and the phys-
ical magnitudes are represented by real functions over Γ. These functions
commute between each other and can be interpreted as possessing definite
values independently of measurement, i.e. each function can be interpreted
as being actual. The term ‘actual’ refers here to preexistence (within the
transcendent representation) and not to hic et nunc observation. Every
physical system may be described exclusively by means of its actual proper-
ties. The change of the system may be described by the change of its actual
properties. Potential or possible properties are considered as the points to
which the system might arrive in a future instant of time. As also noted by
Dieks:
“In classical physics the most fundamental description of a physical
system (a point in phase space) reflects only the actual, and nothing
that is merely possible. It is true that sometimes states involving prob-
abilities occur in classical physics: think of the probability distributions
ρ in statistical mechanics. But the occurrence of possibilities in such
cases merely reflects our ignorance about what is actual. The statis-
tical states do not correspond to features of the actual system (unlike
the case of the quantum mechanical superpositions), but quantify our
lack of knowledge of those actual features.” [24, p. 124]
Classical mechanics tells us via the equation of motion how the state of the
system moves along the curve determined by the initial conditions in Γ and
thus, as any mechanical property may be expressed in terms of Γ’s variables,
how all of them evolve. Moreover, the structure in which actual properties
may be organized is the (Boolean) algebra of classical logic.
3 Physical Probability and Subjective Ignorance
We believe that a realist coherent interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
(QM) should be capable of providing an internal understanding of its physi-
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cal concepts. Since Born’s 1926 interpretation of the quantum wave function
Ψ, probability has become one of the key notions in the description of quan-
tum phenomena. But the difficulties to interpret quantum probability were
already explicit in Born’s original paper.
“Schro¨dinger’s quantum mechanics [therefore] gives quite a definite
answer to the question of the effect of the collision; but there is no
question of any causal description. One gets no answer to the question,
‘what is the state after the collision’ but only to the question, ‘how
probable is a specified outcome of the collision’.
Here the whole problem of determinism comes up. From the stand-
point of our quantum mechanics there is no quantity which in any in-
dividual case causally fixes the consequence of the collision; but also
experimentally we have so far no reason to believe that there are some
inner properties of the atom which condition a definite outcome for the
collision. [...] I myself am inclined to give up determinism in the world
of the atoms. But that is a philosophical question for which physical
arguments alone are not decisive.” [45, p. 57]
In his paper Born formulated the now-standard interpretation of ψ(x) as
encoding a probability density function for a certain particle to be found
at a given region. The wave function is a complex-valued function of a
continuous variable. For a state ψ, the associated probability function is
ψ∗ψ, which is equal to |ψ(x)|2. If |ψ(x)|2 has a finite integral over the
whole of three-dimensional space, then it is possible to choose a normalizing
constant. The probability that a particle is within a particular region V
is the integral over V of |ψ(x)|2. However, even though this interpretation
worked fairly well, it soon became evident that the concept of probability
in the new theory departed from the physical notion considered in classical
statistical mechanics as lack of knowledge about a preexistent (actual) state
of affairs described in terms of definite valued properties.
In the history of physics the development of probability took place through
a concrete physical problem and has a long history which goes back to the
18th century. The physical problem with which probability dealt was the
problem of characterizing a state of affairs of which there is an incomplete
knowledge. Or in other words, “gambling”. This physical problem was con-
nected later on to a mathematical theory developed by Laplace and others.
But it was only after Kolmogorov that this mathematical theory found a
closed set of axioms [35]. Although there are still today many interpreta-
tional problems regarding the physical understanding of classical probability,
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when a realist physicist talks about probability in statistical mechanics he
is discussing about the (average values of) properties of an uncertain —but
existent— state of affairs.4 This is why the problem to determine a def-
inite state of affairs in QM —the sets of definite valued properties which
characterize the quantum system— poses also problems to the interpreta-
tion of probability and possibility within the theory itself. As noticed by
Schro¨dinger in a letter to Einstein:
“It seems to me that the concept of probability is terribly mishandled
these days. Probability surely has as its substance a statement as to
whether something is or is not the case —an uncertain statement, to be
sure. But nevertheless it has meaning only if one is indeed convinced
that the something in question quite definitely is or is not the case. A
probabilistic assertion presupposes the full reality of its subject.” [8,
p. 115]
We understand mathematics, contrary to physics, as a non-representational
discipline which respects no metaphysical nor empirical limits whatsoever.
The mathematician does not need to constrain himself to any sort of meta-
physical principles but only to the internal structure of the mathematical
theory itself. ‘Probability’ is regarded by the mathematician as a ‘theory
of mathematics’ and in this sense departs from any conceptual physical un-
derstanding which relates the formal structure to the world around us. A
mathematician thinks of a probability model as the set of axioms which fit a
mathematical structure and wonders about the internal consistency rather
than about how this structure relates and can be interpreted in relation to
experience and physical reality. As noticed by Hans Primas:
“Mathematical probability theory is just a branch of pure mathemat-
ics, based on some axioms devoid of any interpretation. In this frame-
work, the concepts ‘probability’, ‘independence’, etc. are conceptually
unexplained notions, they have a purely mathematical meaning. While
there is a widespread agreement concerning the essential features of the
calculus of probability, there are widely diverging opinions what the
referent of mathematical probability theory is.” [39, p. 582]
4In this respect it is important to remark that the orthodox interpretation of probability
in terms of relative frequencies, although provides a conceptual framework to relate to
measurement outcomes, refers to ‘events’ and to ‘properties of a system’; in this sense
it is not necessarily linked to a realistic physical representation but rather supports an
empiricist account of the observed measurement results.
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The important point is that when a mathematician and a physicist talk
about ‘probability’ they need not refer to the same concept. While for the
mathematician the question of the relation between the mathematical struc-
ture of probability and experience plays no significant role, for the physicist
who assumes a realist stance the question of probability is necessarily related
to experience and physical reality.
Luigi Accardi proved in 1981 that there is a direct relation between Bell
inequalities and probability models [1]. The theorem of Accardi states that
any theory which violates Bell inequality has a non-Kolmogorovian proba-
bility model. Since only Kolmogorovian models can be interpreted in terms
of referring to a degree of ignorance of a presupposed state of affairs given by
a set of definite valued preexistent properties, this means that QM possesses
a probability model which cannot be interpreted in terms of ignorance of
such preexistent reality. The fact that QM possesses a non-Kolmogorovian
probability model is not such a big issue from a mathematical perspective:
many mathematicians work with these probability structures and do not get
astonished in any way by them. But from a realistic representational phys-
ical perspective, the question which arises is very deep, namely, what is the
meaning of a concept of probability which does not talk about the degree
of knowledge of a definite state of affairs? From our perspective, if such a
question is not properly acknowledged, the statement “QM is a theory about
probabilities” looses all physical content. It might be regarded as either an
obvious mathematical statement with no interest —it only states the well
known fact that in QM there is a (non-Kolmogrovian) probability measure
assigned via Gleason’s theorem— or a meaningless physical statement, since
we do not know what quantum probability is in terms of a physical concept.
According to our stance, if we are to understand QM as a physical theory,
and not merely as a mathematical or algorithmic structure, it is clear that
we still need to provide a link between the mathematical structure and a
set of physical concepts which are capable of providing a coherent account
of quantum phenomena.
4 Empirical Terms vs Physical Concepts
Logical positivists fought strongly against dogmatic metaphysical thought,
imposing a reconsideration of observability beyond the a priori categories
of Kantian metaphysics. In their famous Manifesto [10] they argued that:
“Everything is accessible to man; and man is the measure of all things. Here
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is an affinity with the Sophists, not with the Platonists; with the Epicure-
ans, not with the Pythagoreans; with all those who stand for earthly being
and the here and now.” Their main attack to metaphysics was designed
through the idea that one should focus in “statements as they are made
by empirical science; their meaning can be determined by logical analysis
or, more precisely, through reduction to the simplest statements about the
empirically given.” Their architectonic stood on the distinction between
empirical terms, the empirically “given” in physical theories, and theoretical
terms, their translation into simple statements. This separation and corre-
spondence between theoretical statements and empirical observation would
have deep consequences not only regarding the problems addressed in phi-
losophy of science but also with respect to the limits of development of many
different lines of research. The important point is that even though within
the philosophy of science community this distinction has been strongly crit-
icized and even characterized as “naive”; many of the problems discussed
in the literature still presuppose it implicitly. Indeed, as remarked by Curd
and Cover:
“Logical positivism is dead and logical empiricism is no longer an
avowed school of philosophical thought. But despite our historical and
philosophical distance from logical positivism and empiricism, their in-
fluence can be felt. An important part of their legacy is observational-
theoretical distinction itself, which continues to play a central role in
debates about scientific realism.” [11, p. 1228]
One of the major consequences of this “naive” perspective towards observa-
tion is that physical concepts become supplementary elements in the analysis
of physical theories. Indeed, when a physical phenomenon is understood as
independent of physical concepts and metaphysical presuppositions, empir-
ical terms configure an objective set of data which can be directly related
—without any metaphysical constrain— to a formal scheme. Actual em-
pirical observations become then the very fundament of physical theories
which, following Mach, should be understood as providing an “economical”
account of such observational data. As a consequence, metaphysics and
physical concepts are completely out of the main picture.
Empirical Data ————— Theoretical Terms
(Supplementary Interpretation)
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According to this scheme, physical concepts are not essentially needed
since the analysis of a theory can be done by addressing the logical struc-
ture which accounts for the empirical data. The role of concepts becomes
then accessory: adding metaphysics might help us to picture what is going
on according to a theory. Like van Fraassen argues [43], it might be in-
teresting to know what the world is like according to an interpretation of
a formalism. However, one can perfectly do without interpretation when
the question addressed is only related to empirical findings. Many realists
within philosophy of physics, while they stress the need of an interpretation
accept the idea that the formalism already provides direct access to empir-
ical data. Like a Troyan horse, these realist schemes have hidden within
the main weapon (metaphysical presupposition) of the enemy (empiricism).
Indeed, in philosophy of physics both realists and empiricists seem to agree
that metaphysical schemes are only necessary when attempting to “under-
stand” —a term which remains dependent on the philosophical stance— a
physical theory. Their distance seems to be the strength with which they
argue for or against the need of interpretation. This is the main reason
why the “interpretation” of a theory has been understood in philosophy
of physics as something “added” to an already formalized empirical the-
ory. Thus, physical concepts are not directly related to the metaphysical
foundation of phenomena and experience.5
Against this fundamentally empiricist based perspective —extensively
widespread within philosophy of physics even in the context of supposedly
realist perspectives— we understand that each physical theory is a triad
composed by a mathematical formalism, a conceptual network and a limited,
specific field of phenomena. In this scheme physical notions play a funda-
mental role. Physical concepts are defined through metaphysical principles
which configure and determine physical experience itself. Physical obser-
vation cannot be considered in terms of “common sense” realism, physical
observation is always theory-laden. We are always have to deal with a phys-
ical (and metaphysical) representation; and thus, the analysis must always
begin, not by collecting a set of “naked” empirical data, but by considering
and making explicit the metaphysical presuppositions related to the theory
and its phenomena. Our philosophical post-Kantian realist position stresses
the need to consider physical notions as fundamental elements of a theory,
5A clear expression of this situation is the so called “underdetermination problem”
which implicitly assumes that a theory can account for phenomena independently of a
metaphysical scheme.
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without which physical observation of phenomena cannot be defined. As
obvious as it is, a ‘field’ cannot be observed without the notion of field, we
simply cannot observe a ‘particle’ or a ‘wave’ without presupposing such
physical concepts. These concepts are undoubtedly part of a metaphysical
architectonic developed through centuries. Naturalizing such concepts in
terms of “common sense” givens is turning a specific metaphysical scheme
into dogma.
“Concepts that have proven useful in ordering things easily achieve
such an authority over us that we forget their earthly origins and ac-
cept them as unalterable givens. Thus they come to be stamped as
‘necessities of thought,’ ‘a priori givens,’ etc. The path of scientific
advance is often made impossible for a long time through such errors.”
[25, p. 102]
In particular, it is important to remark that all classical physical entities
—as we discussed above— presuppose the metaphysical PE, PNC and PI.
These are not principles that are found or observed in the world, but the
very conditions that allow us to determine physical experience itself [17]. As
remarked by Einstein in his famous recommendation, which led Heisenberg
to the principle of indetermination: “It is only the theory which can tell
you what can be observed.” Einstein’s philosophical position has been many
times carichaturized in the literature as a scientific realist.6 The fact that
“he was not the friend of any simple realism” [32, p. 206] can be witnessed
from the very interesting remark, recalled by Heisenberg, in which Einstein
explained:
“I have no wish to appear as an advocate of a naive form of realism; I
know that these are very difficult questions, but then I consider Mach’s
concept of observation also much too naive. He pretends that we know
perfectly well what the word ‘observe’ means, and thinks this exempts
him from having to discriminate between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’
phenomena. No wonder his principle has so suspiciously commercial a
name: ‘thought economy.’ His idea of simplicity is much too subjective
6As remarked by Howard [33, p. 73], Einstein was certainly part of the neo-Kantian
tradition: “Einstein was dismayed by the Vienna Circle’s ever more stridently anti-
metaphysical doctrine. The group dismissed as metaphysical any element of theory whose
connection to experience could not be demonstrated clearly enough. But Einstein’s dis-
agreement with the Vienna Circle went deeper. It involved fundamental questions about
the empirical interpretation and testing of theories.”
11
for me. In reality, the simplicity of natural laws is an objective fact as
well, and the correct conceptual scheme must balance the subjective
side of this simplicity with the objective. But that is a very difficult
task.” A. Einstein quoted by W. Heisenberg [30, p. 66]
Einstein’s position was orthodoxy at the time. Most of the founding fathers
of QM —exception made of Dirac— were also part of this same neo-Kantian
tradition which understood that the observation of physical phenomena was
metaphysically constrained. Following Einstein’s dictum, Heisenberg went
also against the positivist interpretation of empirical science as disconnected
from metaphysical presuppositions:
“The history of physics is not only a sequence of experimental discov-
eries and observations, followed by their mathematical description; it is
also a history of concepts. For an understanding of the phenomena the
first condition is the introduction of adequate concepts. Only with the
help of correct concepts can we really know what has been observed.”
[31, p. 264]
Going back to our scheme, the three elements that compose a physical
theory form a perfect circle with no preeminence of one over the other. All
three elements are interrelated in such a way that only through their mutual
inter-definition we can access physical experience.
Conceptual Network Mathematical Formalism
Field of Phenomena
In order to be clear about our perspective of analysis we would like to make
explicit our philosophical stance which takes into account metaphysical rep-
resentation and the theory ladenness of physical observation right from the
start:
Representational Realist Stance (RRS): A representational realist ac-
count of a physical theory must be capable of providing a physical (and meta-
physical) representation of reality in terms of a network of concepts which
coherently relates to the mathematical formalism of the theory and allows to
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make predictions of a definite field of phenomena (expressed through such
concepts).
According to our RRS physical statements about phenomena must be nec-
essarily related to the physical (and metaphysical) representation provided
by the theory in terms of definite physical concepts. There is no “common
sense” experience in physics. Every experience in physics is a restricted expe-
rience, constrained by physical concepts and metaphysical presuppositions.
Physics is in essence a metaphysical enterprise. As Einstein remarked: “The
problem is that physics is a kind of metaphysics; physics describes ‘reality’.
But we do not know what ‘reality’ is. We know it only through physical
description...” From this perspective, the problem with the orthodox for-
malism of QM is that it provides predictions which have not been coherently
related to a network of adequate physical concepts. To say it shortly, we do
not know what QM is talking about. But if we do not know how to account
for the ‘clicks’ in detectors in a typical quantum experiment, we simply don’t
understand either what is a quantum phenomenon. Still today, the ‘quan-
tum clicks’ that we find in the lab do not have a conceptual or metaphysical
support. Boole-Bell type inequalities have proven that ‘quantum clicks’ lie
outside the scope of classical local-realistic theories.7 What we do know in
fact is that, if we respect the orthodox formalism of QM, those ‘clicks’ are
not being produced by classical entities.
5 The EPR-Battle: Counterfactual Statements and
(Actual) Elements of Physical Reality
The power of physics comes from its amazing predictive capacity; something
that is exposed through the empirical confirmation of (operational) counter-
factual statements. If a theory is empirically adequate then counterfactual
statements of the type: “if we measure physical quantity A, the result will
be x; but if we measure instead physical quantity B the result will be y”
are always considered to be what the theory is talking about. As clearly
expressed by Griffiths [28, p. 361]: “If a theory makes a certain amount of
7As remarked by Itamar Pitowsky [38, p. 95]: “In the mid-nineteenth century George
Boole formulated his ‘conditions of possible experience’. These are equations and inequal-
ities that the relative frequencies of (logically connected) events must satisfy. Some of
Boole’s conditions have been rediscovered in more recent years by physicists, including
Bell inequalities, Clauser Horne inequalities, and many others.”
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sense and gives predictions which agree reasonably well with experimental
or observational results, scientists are inclined to believe that its logical and
mathematical structure reflects the structure of the real world in some way,
even if philosophers will remain permanently skeptical.” Indeed, operational
counterfactual statements conform the core of the objective physical reality
the theory describes. Counterfactual reasoning is a necessary condition not
only for constructing a representation that provides an objective account
of physical reality independent of the choices and actions of subjects but
also for physical discursivity itself. We should remark, due to the ongoing
debate about counterfactuals in QM, that these kind of physical statements
need not be necessarily related to “possible worlds” or to “the reification
of modalities” —a particular way of analyzing these subjects by logicians
and analytic metaphysics which has also penetrated deeply philosophy of
physics. In physics, operational counterfactual reasoning does not imply
that every statement is actually real. Obviously, the fact that I can imagine
an experience in the future does not imply its reality. Operational counter-
factual reasoning has been assumed in every physical theory that we know
and allows a theory to make predictions in terms of meaningful physical
statements.
Meaningful Physical Statements (MPS): If given a specific situation
a theory is capable of predicting in terms of definite physical statements
the outcomes of possible measurements, then such physical statements are
meaningful relative to the theory and must be considered as constitutive parts
of the particular representation of physical reality that the theory provides.
Measurement outcomes must be understood only as exposing the empirical
adequacy (or not) of the theory.
MPS are not necessarily statements about future events, such as for example
“if I measure the spin in the x-direction, I will obtain spin-up with proba-
bility 0.4 and spin-down with probability 0.6.” MPS can be also statements
about the past or the present. For example, according to some physical the-
ories I can claim that “the earth was formed about 4.54 billion years ago”
(long before even physics was imagined!), or that if someone would perform
a free fall experiment in the moon at this very moment, due to its gravity,
“the object would be falling accelerated at 1.6 m
s2
.” That is indeed the magic
of both physics (and metaphysics), the possibility to represent, think and
imagine beyond the here and now.
Physical statements that allow to predict certain phenomena have been
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always intuitively related to physical reality. According to physicists, if we
possess an empirically adequate physical description of a state of affairs we
can predict what will happen in any particular experiment.8 For instance, we
also know what might have happened if I had performed an experiment in the
past or in the present, in a different place to the one I am now. Experiments
in classical physics allow us to learn about the preexistent properties of a
system. The strong realist presupposition is that once we have an empirically
adequate theory we don’t even need to perform an experiment in order to
know the result! Take for example a physical object as a small ball, one
can imagine all the possible experiments that one could perform inside a
lab with it. We know the acceleration of a ball in a free fall experiment on
earth will be 9.8 m
s2
and we can also predict the motion of the ball if we
through it inside the room. There are indeed many experiments we could
perform of which we know the answer beforehand by simply calculating their
results using classical mechanics. There is no single physicist that would
dare go against the predictions of classical Newtonian mechanics. And that
is the whole beauty of physics, at least from a realist perspective: physical
representations talk about physical reality independently of the here and
now.
The importance of counterfactual statements as related to physical re-
ality was stressed, in the context of QM, by Einstein himself in 1935, in
a famous article which would be known as the “EPR paper” [26]. In it,
Einstein together with his students Podolsky and Rosen, used his famous
definition of what was to be considered an element of physical reality in or-
der to show that QM seemed not to be a complete theory. As remarked by
them: “Whatever the meaning assigned to the term complete, the follow-
ing requirement for a complete theory seems to be a necessary one: every
element of physical reality must have a counterpart in the physical theory.”
[Op. cit., p. 777] Indeed, this seems to be a necessary condition for a
theory which attempts to provide an account of physical reality. However,
Einstein’s definition stressed only a limited set of the MPS predicted by
quantum theory. His definition focused only on those MPS which could be
related to an actualist metaphysical account of physical reality —leaving
aside the more general probabilistic statements.
8It is interesting to notice that in such kind of statements we see the two main un-
derstandings of actuality coming together: the actuality hic et nunc of observations is an
expression of the actual preexistent mode of existence of properties. Unfortunately, it is
very frequent to find in the literature a mixture between these two different meanings of
actuality.
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Einstein’s (Actual) Element of Physical Reality: If, without in any
way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e., with probability
equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element
of reality corresponding to that quantity.
As remarked by Aerts and Sassoli [2, p. 20]: “the notion of ‘element of
reality’ is exactly what was meant by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, in their
famous 1935 article. An element of reality is a state of prediction: a property
of an entity that we know is actual, in the sense that, should we decide to
observe it (i.e., to test its actuality), the outcome of the observation would
be certainly successful.” Indeed, certainty and actuality were the restrictive
constraints of what could be considered in terms of physical reality.
But Bohr, contrary to Einstein, had a very different standpoint regarding
the meaning of physics in general, and of QM in particular. In his 1935 reply
paper to EPR [4] —appeared in the following volume of Physical Review—
he argued that in QM things were completely different to any other physical
theory. Bohr wanted to presuppose classical discourse in terms of classical
notions (e. g., waves and particles) even at the price of restricting the multi-
ple contexts of analysis provided by the formalism itself. Even though each
basis was directly related to the correct predictions of statistical outcomes
of observables, it was argued that in order to discuss about quantum prop-
erties the very precondition was the choice of a single context (interpreted
in terms of an experimental arrangement). In this way, quantum physics
had been restricted to the here and now experimental set-up. At the same
time, Bohr [45, p. 7] had strongly argued about the impossibility of pro-
viding a physical representation of QM beyond classical notions, claiming
that: “[...] the unambiguous interpretation of any measurement must be es-
sentially framed in terms of classical physical theories, and we may say that
in this sense the language of Newton and Maxwell will remain the language
of physicists for all time.” According to him [Op. cit., p. 7], “it would
be a misconception to believe that the difficulties of the atomic theory may
be evaded by eventually replacing the concepts of classical physics by new
conceptual forms.” The choice of Bohr was to stick to classical discourse
and give up operational counterfactual reasoning of MPS in QM —which
was explicitly used within the EPR argument. Bohr was willing to develop
a new complementarity scheme even at the price of abandoning the physical
representation of quantum reality.
Bohr took as a standpoint the idea that observed measurement outcomes
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were perfectly defined in QM and added the necessity of choosing a particular
context between the many possible ones9 in order to recover a classical “as-if
discourse” in terms of “waves” and “particles”.
“[...] the choice between the experimental procedures suited for the
prediction of the position or the momentum of a single particle which
has passed through a slit in a diaphragm, we are, in the ‘freedom
of choice’ offered by the last arrangement, just concerned with the
discrimination between different experimental procedures which allow
of the unambiguous use of complementarity classical concepts.” [4, p.
699]
But this complementarity scheme designed by the Danish physicist pre-
cluded —since it denied operational counterfactual reasoning itself— the
very possibility of relating MPS to an objective physical description of re-
ality —independent of subjective choices. After Bohr’s reply [4], unlike a
classical object which preexists (in terms of definite valued properties) in-
dependently of the choice of any experiment, it was accepted that quantum
systems and properties were explicitly dependent on the choice of an exper-
imental arrangement or context.
Once and again it was repeated that Bohr had been “the true winner of
the EPR battle” —as well as of the Solvay confrontation some years before.
However, no one could really explain why. Bohr had designed a contradic-
tory algorithmic language based on his complementarity principle according
to which, it only made sense to talk about “waves” and “particles” once
the choice of an experimental set up had been performed by the physicist in
the lab. Subjectivity had been introduced for the first time within physical
description, creating what is known today as “the quantum omelette” (see
for discussion [21]). As most clearly stated by Jaynes:
“[O]ur present [quantum mechanical] formalism is not purely episte-
mological; it is a peculiar mixture describing in part realities of Nature,
in part incomplete human information about Nature —all scrambled
up by Heisenberg and Bohr into an omelette that nobody has seen how
to unscramble. Yet we think that the unscrambling is a prerequisite
for any further advance in basic physical theory. For, if we cannot sep-
arate the subjective and objective aspects of the formalism, we cannot
know what we are talking about; it is just that simple.” [34, p. 381]
9A problem known today in the literature as the infamous basis problem. One that
has found no true solution until the present.
17
But to be fare, it was not true that Bohr wanted to discuss about reality.
His scheme was totally consistent and very difficult to tackle. It rested on an
understanding of physics in highly pragmatic terms, as a “tool” to approach
intersubjective agreement between experimentalists. In this respect, Bohr
was indeed much closer to logical positivism than he himself would have
admitted.
“Physics is to be regarded not so much as the study of something a
priori given, but rather as the development of methods of ordering
and surveying human experience. In this respect our task must be
to account for such experience in a manner independent of individual
subjective judgement and therefor objective in the sense that it can be
unambiguously communicated in ordinary human language.” [5]
Even though Bohr was a neo-Kantian himself which understood phenom-
ena as related to metaphysical principles, against metaphysical questions
and problems, he was in line with the positivist appeal to Sophists and
their epistemological perspective which placed the subject —and his here
and now experience— as the fundament of knowledge itself. Bohr, con-
trary to the logical positivists who presupposed a “common sense” here and
now observation, had placed his a priori in classical language —which had
the purpose of constraining phenomena as classical space-time phenomena.
Bohr had reintroduced Protagoras dictum within physics, adding to it the
importance of classical language and connecting physics to the main philo-
sophical debate of the 20th century: the linguistic turn. His new precept
could be read in the following terms: the subject and his (classical) language
are the measure of al things. Bohr was not interested in the problem of
reality. Instead of getting into the riddle of an ontological analysis Bohr
focused on epistemological concerns. Indeed, as remarked by A. Petersen,
his long time assistant:
“Traditional philosophy has accustomed us to regard language as some-
thing secondary and reality as something primary. Bohr considered
this attitude toward the relation between language and reality inap-
propriate. When one said to him that it cannot be language which
is fundamental, but that it must be reality which, so to speak, lies
beneath language, and of which language is a picture, he would reply,
“We are suspended in language in such a way that we cannot say what
is up and what is down. The word ‘reality’ is also a word, a word
18
which we must learn to use correctly.” Bohr was not puzzled by on-
tological problems or by questions as to how concepts are related to
reality. Such questions seemed sterile to him. He saw the problem of
knowledge in a different light.” [37, p. 11]
Bohr wanted to develop a language that would allow us to account for phe-
nomena in terms of classical physical concepts, even at the price of dissolv-
ing the relation between such concepts and reality. His complementarity
approach was designed in order to support the inconsistencies of such in-
compatible relations. This had very important consequences for the devel-
opment of physics. As Fine makes the point:
“[The] instrumentalist moves, away from a realist construal of the
emerging quantum theory, were given particular force by Bohr’s so-
called ‘philosophy of complementarity’; and this nonrealist position
was consolidated at the time of the famous Solvay conference, in Oc-
tober of 1927, and is firmly in place today. Such quantum nonrealism
is part of what every graduate physicist learns and practices. It is the
conceptual backdrop to all the brilliant success in atomic, nuclear, and
particle physics over the past fifty years. Physicists have learned to
think about their theory in a highly nonrealist way, and doing just
that has brought about the most marvelous predictive success in the
history of science.” [11, p. 1195]
Contrary to Fine we do not understand this as “the most marvelous” epoch
of science but rather as a quite obscure period in which we have not ad-
vanced much in really understanding one of the main theories of the 20th
Century. After more than one century after its creation we still don’t know
what QM is talking about. Contrary to Bohr, we believe it is possible to
develop a (non-naive) post-Katian realist position, one that understands
that every physical theory must presupposed objective physical representa-
tion of reality, and that in this respect QM cannot be an exception. Giving
up physical representation would be giving up physics itself, for the lack of
representation transforms physics into mere technique.
Our RRS attempts to bring back metaphysical considerations in the
analysis of QM by taking into account three main desiderata: the first is
that physical observation is theory-laden and thus always metaphysically
founded; the second is that operational counterfactual reasoning about MPS
is the kernel of physical discourse and in consequence cannot be abandoned if
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we seek to find an objective representation of physical reality; the third and
final desideratum is that predictions must be necessarily related to the phys-
ical representation of reality provided by the theory. Against Bohr, (actual)
experiments and measurements cannot be regarded as the point of depar-
ture, since it is only the theory which can tell you what can be observed. We
need to do exactly the opposite, we need to read out an objective physical
description from the formalism escaping at the same time dogmatic classical
metaphysics —which is today still grounded in the metaphysical notion of
actuality. Just like Einstein taught us to do in Relativity, we need to con-
centrate on what the theory predicts, and be ready to come up with new
physical concepts that match the formalism and explain phenomena. From
our perspective —contrary to Bohr’s dogmatism with respect to classical
language and physical experience—, every new physical theory determines
a radically new field of experience which is necessarily related to a language
constituted by new physical concepts.
6 Actual Properties and Observation in QM
The general metaphysical principle implied by the understanding of Newto-
nian mechanics, that ‘Actuality = Reality’, has become an unquestionable
dogma within physics. As a silent fundament all of physics has been devel-
oped following the metaphysics of actuality. And even though QM was born
from a deep positivist deconstruction of the a priori classical Newtonian no-
tions —and in this sense the philosophy of Mach can be understood as the
very precondition for the creation of both QM and relativity theory— it was
very soon reestablished within the limits of classical metaphysics itself. The
constrains of actuality have been unquestionably accepted by philosophers
of physics either in terms of hic et nunc observation (empiricism and its
variants) or as the mode of preexistence of properties (realism). Both posi-
tions have remained captive of actualism; trapped in the metaphysical net
designed (through the PE, PNC and PI) by Aristotle around the 5th cen-
tury before Christ and imposed by Newton in the 18th Century of our time.
Actual (preexistent) properties and actual (here and now) observations are
two sides of the same (metaphysical) coin.
Today, both realists and anti-realists support an anti-metaphysical un-
derstanding of observation within philosophy of physics. It is accepted by
both parties that QM is an empirically adequate theory and, consequently,
that the problem is not related to the understanding of quantum phenom-
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ena. This can be directly linked not only to the positivist “common sense” or
“naive” understanding of observation, but also —maybe more importantly—
to Bohr’s analysis of QM based on the idea that any physical phenomena
is a classical phenomena, or in his own words, to the idea that “[...] the
unambiguous interpretation of any measurement must be essentially framed
in terms of classical physical theories”. In the present, van Fraassen [42, pp.
202-203] has followed this path developing an empiricist stance according
to which: “To develop an empiricist account of science is to depict it as
involving a search for truth only about the empirical world, about what is
actual and observable.” Making explicit the fact that observation should
be understood in terms of “common sense” observation. The problem, ac-
cording to van Fraassen, only appears with respect to the “non-observable”
entities —such as e.g, an atom or an electron. Instrumentalists assume
exactly the same ground (as empiricist) considering actual observation in
terms of “common sense” observation of measurement outcomes. As made
explicit by Fuchs and Peres: “[...] quantum theory does not describe physi-
cal reality. What it does is provide an algorithm for computing probabilities
for the macroscopic events (“detector clicks”) that are the consequences of
experimental interventions.” On the other hand, realists approaches to QM
have focused on Einstein’s implicit use of the elements of physical reality in
terms of actuality and his recommendation to extend QM —which should
be considered as “incomplete”— to a more general formalism, one that goes
back to a description in terms of actual properties restoring “a classical way
of thinking about what there is.” [3] This idea, presupposed by the Hidden
Variable Program (HVP), has also permeated strongly the rest of realist
interpretations of QM, which in one way or the other have ended up al-
ways discussing in terms of actual properties, grounded as well on “common
sense” observation. Such is the case of the modal interpretation of Dieks,
Griffiths’ consistent histories approach, and the many worlds interpretation.
Even those interpretations such as the ones proposed by Heisenberg, Pop-
per, Margenau and Piron, that have argued in favor of considering a different
realm to that of actuality, were not able to advance in an ontological defi-
nition of such realm. Potentialities, propensities and dispositions have been
repeatedly defined only in terms of a process of becoming actual (see for
discussion [14]). These teleological schemes have betrayed, because of their
standpoint and focus on the measurement problem, any true possibility of
progress and development beyond the actual realm.
Actuality imposes a mode of being (of both properties and observations)
determined by the PE, the PNC and the PI. Everything is reduced then
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either to: yes-no properties or yes-no experimental observations. But what
if QM cannot be subsumed under the metaphysical equation imposed by
Newtonian physics: Actuality = Reality?
7 Revisiting Quantum Physical Reality
We believe it would be no exaggeration to claim that the EPR paper together
with Bohr’s reply, have determined the fate of QM up to the present. The
EPR paper ended with a recommendation to extend QM in order to recover
a classical actualist understanding about what there is:
“While we thus have shown that the wave function does not provide
a complete description of the [actual] physical reality, we left open the
question of whether or not such a description [of actual properties]
exists. We believe, however, that such theory is possible.” [26, p. 780]
Bohr argued instead that:
“While [...] in classical physics the distinction between object and
measuring agencies does not entail any difference in the character of the
description of the phenomena concerned, it fundamental importance in
quantum theory [...] has its root in the indispensable use of classical
concepts in the interpretation of all proper measurements, even tough
the classical theories do not suffice in accounting for the new types
of regularities with which we are concerned in atomic physics.” [4, p.
701]
EPR was the final battle of the two main figures in the physics of the
20th century, and even though Bohr was declared the only triumphant sur-
vivor, both lines were developed under the constraints and limits of the
logical positivist “naive” or “common sense” understanding of observation
—abandoning one of the main discussions of the founding fathers of QM
regarding the meaning of quantum phenomena and observation. After the
clash of the two titans, physicists were confronted with a choice between
two different paths. Either they could follow Bohr and be satisfied with
an inconsistent intersubjective language ruled by complementarity (see [?])
with no direct reference to physical reality, or they could follow Einstein
and try to find a new formalism that would allow them to recover a classical
actualist type-description of physical (quantum) reality. But this crossroad,
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imposed by Einstein, Bohr and logical positivism, hides a road sign called
Wolfgang Pauli which exposed the lines of a more radical resolution to the
quantum riddle. Indeed, between the founding fathers, we regard Wolfgang
Pauli as the most radical and revolutionary thinker of all. Against Bohr,
he stood always close to metaphysics and the problem of reality; beyond
Einstein, he was ready to reconsider the meaning and definition of physical
reality itself.10
“When the layman says ‘reality’ he usually thinks that he is speaking
about something which is self-evidently known; while to me it appears
to be specifically the most important and extremely difficult task of
our time to work on the elaboration of a new idea of reality.” [36, p.
193]
What do we mean when we say that “particles are physically real ac-
cording to classical mechanics”? Following Heisenberg and his closed the-
ory approach, this question has a definite answer according to our RRS. It
means that classical mechanics is capable of expressing through the relation
between the formalism of mathematical calculus and a network of concepts
—such as, for example, space, time, particle, mass, position, velocity— a
broad field of phenomena. It is in this sense that the notion of particle is
a metaphysical machinery which allows us to express reality. In QM we
have a sound formalism, with features such as contextuality, superposition
and indetermination which defy a realist classical scheme in terms of an
ASA. However, all approaches until today have stood close to physical re-
ality understood in an actualist fashion. Because of this, the features of
the quantum formalism have been regarded as “problems” which we need to
bypass or overcome in order to recover our classical way of thinking about
what there is. Our proposed line of research, following Pauli, is to turn the
problem upside-down. What we need to do is to develop physical reality
according to what QM needs it to be.
Heisenberg’s closed theory approach is the key to abandon another pre-
supposed dogma —also imposed by Bohr— according to which QM must be
related to classical physics in terms of a limit. Once we accept the possibility
of considering an independent metaphysical scheme to account for QM, the
“problems” addressed in the literature become instead essential features of
the metaphysical system we need to construct in order to coherently relate
the formalism with physical reality and experience. We need to develop a
10Which for Einstein was determined through space-time separability.
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new way of understanding reality beyond the ruling of actuality. To escape
the ruling of actuality —both in terms of hic et nunc observation and pre-
existent properties— means to abandon, on the one hand, the idea that we
have a clear definition of what is observed according to QM, and on the
other hand, the idea that actuality is the only possible way to conceive and
understand physical reality. Our strategy is to take as a standpoint the for-
malism and its predictive power in order to develop new physical concepts
which relate coherently to the formalism and can allow us to think about
the physical meaning of quantum phenomena.
8 Objective Probability and Generalized Elements
of Physical Reality
The quantum wave function Ψ provides definite physical statements regard-
ing observables through the Born rule. The MPS provided by QM, state-
ments that have been used in order to develop experimental situations and
outstanding technological developments, are of the following type:
Definition 8.1 MPS in QM: Given a vector in Hilbert space, Ψ, the Born
rule allows us to predict the average value of (any) observable O.
〈Ψ|O|Ψ〉 = 〈O〉
This prediction is independent of the choice of any particular basis.
To take seriously the QM formalism means for us to take into account
all the predictions provided by QM; i.e., both certain (probability equal to
unity) and statistical (probability between zero and unity) predictions about
physical quantities. We need to create a new understanding of probability
in terms of objective knowledge abandoning its classical understanding in
terms of ignorance about an actual state of affairs. But how to do so in
relation to physical reality? We believe that a good standpoint is the gen-
eralization of Einstein’s realist definition of an element of physical reality.
The redefinition must keep the relation imposed between predictive state-
ments and reality, but leave aside both the actualist constraint imposed by
certainty (probability equal to unity) and the importance of measurement
which should be only regarded as confirming or disconfirming a specific pre-
diction of a theory.
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Generalized Element of Physical Reality: If we can predict in any way
(i.e., both probabilistically or with certainty) the value of a physical quantity,
then there exists an element of reality corresponding to that quantity.
By extending the limits of what can be considered as physically real, we
have also opened the door to a new understanding of QM beyond classical
physics. The problem is now set: we now need to find a physical concept
that is capable of being statistically defined in objective terms. That means
to find a notion that is not defined in terms of yes-no experiments (as it is the
case of classical properties), but is defined instead in terms of a probabilistic
measure. Of course, this first step must be accompanied by developing a
network of physical notions that accounts for what QM is talking about,
beyond measurement outcomes. In the end, our new non-classical physical
scheme will also have to be capable of taking into account the main features
brought in by the orthodox formalism.
i. Our network of physical concepts must provide a deeper understanding
of the principle of indetermination, the principle of superposition, the
quantum postulate and quantum phenomena in general.
ii. Our network of physical concepts must also explain the physical mean-
ing of non-locality, non-separability and quantum contextuality.
iii. Our metaphysical scheme must be capable of recovering an objective
notion of measurement (one that exposes a preexistent state of affairs).
iv. The physical representation must account for all MPS in QM respect-
ing (operational) counterfactual reasoning (as in any physical theory).
We believe it is possible to come up with a physical network of concepts
that takes into account these features. The price to pay is to abandon
the metaphysics of actuality and construct a new non-classical metaphysical
scheme with physical concepts specifically designed in order to account for
the orthodox formalism of QM.
9 Potential Powers in QM
Our research has analyzed the idea of considering a mode of existence truly
independent of actuality, namely, ontological potentiality. Elsewhere, we
have introduced ontological potentiality as the realm of which QM talks
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about. This realm is defined by the principles of indetermination, super-
position and difference. In order to advance we also need to introduce the
notions of Potential State of Affairs (PSA), potential effectuation and im-
manent cause [15, 18]. Indeed, by developing these new concepts, we expect
that our formal analysis regarding quantum possibility [22] can find a co-
herent physical interpretation. But now the question arises: what are the
“things” which exist and interact within this potential realm? Our answer
is: powers with definite potentia. Indeed, while entities are composed by
properties which exist in the actual mode of being, we have argued that an
interesting candidate to consider what exists according to QM is the notion
of power. Elsewhere [14, 15], we have put forward such an ontological inter-
pretation of powers. In the following we summarize such ideas and provide
an axiomatic characterization of QM in line with these concepts.
The mode of being of a power is potentiality, not thought in terms of
classical possibility (which relies on actuality) but rather as a mode of ex-
istence —i.e., in terms of ontological potentiality. To possess the power of
raising my hand, does not mean that in the future ‘I will raise my hand’ or
that in the future ‘I will not raise my hand’; what it means is that, here and
now, I possess a power which exists in the mode of being of potentiality, in-
dependently of what happens or will happen in actuality. Powers do not exist
in the mode of being of actuality, they are not actual existents, they are un-
determined potential existents. Powers, like classical properties, preexist to
observation, but unlike them preexistence is not defined in the actual mode
of being as an Actual State of Affairs (ASA), instead we have a potential
preexistence of powers which determines a Potential State of Affairs (PSA).
While an ASA can be defined in terms of a set of actual properties, a PSA is
defined as a set of powers with definite potentia. Powers are indetermined.
The concept of ‘power’ allow us to compress experience into a picture of the
(quantum) world, just like entities such as particles, waves and fields, allow
us to do so in classical physics. We cannot “see” powers in the same way we
see objects.11 Powers are experienced in actuality through elementary pro-
cessess. A power is sustained by a logic of actions which do not necessarily
take place, it is and is not, hic et nunc.
A basic question which we have posed to ourselves regards the ontological
meaning of a quantum superposition [20]. What does it mean to have a
11It is important to notice there is no difference in this point with the case of entities:
we cannot “see” entities —not in the sense of having a complete access to them. We only
see perspectives which are unified through the notion of object.
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mathematical expression such as: α| ↑〉 + β| ↓〉, which allows us to predict
precisely, according to the Born rule, experimental outcomes? We believe
that quantum superpositions are the central elements of QM. But what is
the physical representation of these quantum superpositions? Our theory
of powers has been explicitly developed in order to try to find an answer
to this particular question. Given a superposition in a particular basis,
Σ ci|αi〉, the powers are represented by the elements of the basis, |αi〉, while
the coordinates in square modulus, |ci|2, are interpreted as the potentia
of each respective power. Powers can be superposed to different —even
contradictory— powers [18]. We understand a quantum superposition as
encoding a set of powers each of which possesses a definite potentia. This
we call a Quantum Situation (QS). For example, the quantum situation
represented by the superposition α| ↑〉 + β| ↓〉, combines the contradictory
powers, | ↑〉 and | ↓〉, with their respective potentia, |α|2 and |β|2. Contrary
to the orthodox interpretation of the quantum state, we do not assume the
metaphysical identity of the multiple mathematical representations given
by different bases [20]. Each superposition is basis dependent and must be
considered as a distinct quantum situation. For example, the superpositions
cx1| ↑x〉 + cx2| ↓x〉 and cy1| ↑y〉 + cy2| ↓y〉, which are representations of the
same Ψ and can be derived from one another via a change in basis, are
interpreted as two different quantum situations, QSΨ,Bx and QSΨ,By .
The logical structure of a superposition is such that a power and its
opposite can exist at one and the same time, violating the principle of non-
contradiction [12]. Within the faculty of raising my hand, both powers (i.e.,
the power ‘I am able to raise my hand’ and the power ‘I am able not to raise
my hand’) co-exist. A QS is compressed activity, something which is and is
not the case, hic et nunc. It cannot be thought in terms of identity but is
expressed as a difference, as a quantum of action.
Our interpretation can be condensed in the following eight postulates.
I. Hilbert Space: QM is represented in a vector Hilbert space.
II. Potential State of Affairs (PSA): A specific vector Ψ with no
given mathematical representation (basis) in Hilbert space represents
a PSA; i.e., the definite existence of a multiplicity of powers, each one
of them with a specific potentia.
III. Actual State of Affairs (ASA): Given a PSA and the choice of a
definite basis B,B′, B′′, ..., etc. —or equivalently a Complete Set of
Commuting Observables (C.S.C.O.)—, a context is defined in which a
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set of powers, each one of them with a definite potentia, are univocally
determined as related to a specific experimental arrangement (which
in turn corresponds to a definite ASA). The context builds a bridge
between the potential and the actual realms, between quantum powers
and classical objects. The experimental arrangement (in the ASA)
allows the powers (in the PSA) to express themselves in actuality
through elementary processes which produce actual effectuations.
IV. Quantum Situations, Powers and Potentia: Given a PSA, Ψ,
and the context or basis, we call a quantum situation to any super-
position of one or more than one power. In general given the basis
B = {|αi〉} the quantum situation QSΨ,B is represented by the follow-
ing superposition of powers:
c1|α1〉+ c2|α2〉+ ...+ cn|αn〉 (1)
We write the quantum situation of the PSA, Ψ, in the context B in
terms of the order pair given by the elements of the basis and the
coordinates in square modulus of the PSA in that basis:
QSΨ,B = (|αi〉, |ci|2) (2)
The elements of the basis, |αi〉, are interpreted in terms of powers.
The coordinates of the elements of the basis, |ci|2, are interpreted as
the potentia of the power |αi〉, respectively. Given the PSA and the
context, the quantum situation, QSΨ,B, is univocally determined in
terms of a set of powers and their respective potentia. (Notice that in
contradistinction with the notion of quantum state the definition of a
quantum situation is basis dependent.)
V. Elementary Process: In QM we only observe discrete shifts of en-
ergy (quantum postulate). These discrete shifts are interpreted in
terms of elementary processes which produce actual effectuations. An
elementary process is the path which undertakes a power from the po-
tential realm to its actual effectuation. This path is governed by the
immanent cause12 which allows the power to remain preexistent in the
potential realm independently of its actual effectuation. Each power
12The immanent cause allows us to connect the power with its actual effectuation with-
out destroying nor deteriorating the power itself. The immanent cause allows for the
expression of effects remaining both in the effects and its cause. It does not only remain
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|αi〉 is univocally related to an elementary process represented by the
projection operator Pαi = |αi〉〈αi|.
VI. Actual Effectuation of Powers (Measurement): Powers exist in
the mode of being of ontological potentiality. An actual effectuation
is the expression of a specific power in actuality. Different actual
effectuations expose the different powers of a given QS. In order to
learn about a specific PSA (constituted by a set of powers and their
potentia) we must measure repeatedly the actual effectuations of each
power exposed in the laboratory. (Notice that we consider a laboratory
as constituted by the set of all possible experimental arrangements that
can be related to the same Ψ.)
VII. Potentia (Born Rule): A potentia is the strength of a power to exist
in the potential realm and to express itself in the actual realm. Given
a PSA, the potentia is represented via the Born rule. The potentia pi
of the power |αi〉 in the specific PSA, Ψ, is given by:
Potentia (|αi〉,Ψ) = 〈Ψ|Pαi |Ψ〉 = Tr[PΨPαi ] (3)
In order to learn about a QS we must observe not only its powers
(which are exposed in actuality through actual effectuations) but we
must also measure the potentia of each respective power. In order to
measure the potentia of each power we need to expose the QS statis-
tically through a repeated series of observations. The potentia, given
by the Born rule, coincides with the probability frequency of repeated
measurements when the number of observations goes to infinity.
VIII. Potential Effectuation of Powers (Schro¨dinger Evolution): Given
a PSA, Ψ, powers and potentia evolve deterministically, independently
of actual effectuations, producing potential effectuations according to
the following unitary transformation:
i~
d
dt
|Ψ(t)〉 = H|Ψ(t)〉 (4)
in itself in order to produce, but also, that which it produces stays within. Thus, in its pro-
duction of effects the potential does not deteriorate by becoming actual —as in the case of
the hylomorphic scheme. Actual results are single effectuations, singularities which expose
the superposition in the actual mode of existence, while superpositions remain evolving
deterministically according to the Schro¨dinger equation in the potential mode of existence,
even interacting with other superpositions and producing new potential effectuations.
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While potential effectuations evolve according to the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion, actual effectuations are particular expressions of each power (that
constitutes the PSA, Ψ) in the actual realm. The ratio of such expres-
sions in actuality is determined by the potentia of each power.
According to our interpretation, just like classical physics talks about en-
tities composed by properties that preexist in the actual realm, QM talks
about powers with definite potentia that preexist in an ontological potential
realm, independently of the specific actual context of inquiry or particular
set of actualizations. This interpretational move allows us to define powers
independently of the context regaining an objective picture of physical real-
ity independent of measurements and subjective choices. The price we are
willing to pay is the abandonment of the Newtonian metaphysical equation
presupposed in the analysis of QM, exposing the fact that: Quantum Reality
6= Actuality.
10 Quantum Probability as an Objective Measure
of the Potentia of Powers
We would like to remark the fact that our notion of physical power is maybe
the first physical notion to be characterized ontologically in terms of a prob-
ability measure. This concept escapes the ruling of actuality since it is
founded on a different set of metaphysical principles to that of classical
entities. Indeed, powers are indetermined, paraconsistent and contextual
existents. Powers can be superposed and entangled with different —even
contradictory— powers [12, 13]. A power, contrary to a property which can
be only true or false possesses an intrinsic probabilistic measure, namely, its
potentia. A potentia is intrinsically statistical, but this statistical aspect has
nothing to do with ignorance. It is instead an objective feature of quantum
physical reality itself.
Objective knowledge of properties is determined through yes-no exper-
iments, one experiment is enough to completely characterize a property.
Boolean classical logic and truth tables are suitable structures that allow
us to define the elements of physical reality present in classical physics —
namely, actual properties. Contrary to classical properties, objective knowl-
edge of powers with definite potentia can be only approached by performing
statistical experiments. One experiment is simply not enough in order to de-
termine the potentia of a power. Boolean classical logic and correspondence
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truth tables are not suitable structures and notions that would allow us to
characterize the physical elements of reality present in QM which are, as we
have discussed above, intrinsically statistical. Indeed, we must remark that
our scheme implies the need of developing a new potential notion of truth,
one that is not understood as a one-to-one relation of propositions with an
actual state of affairs. We leave this work for future papers. Finally, we
must remark that the ontological definition of the potentia of each power
is determined already by the particular PSA, just in the same way a set of
properties is determines in an ASA.
Conclusion
Our conceptual physical scheme allows us to provide a metaphysical ground
to Pauli’s intuition —also shared by Heisenberg, Popper, Margenau, Piron
and many others— that quantum statistics and quantum probability expose
objective features of a quantum situation, instead of “ignorance” or “inac-
curate” knowledge of an ASA. Quantum probabilities of physical quantities
calculated though the Born rule become in our scheme the objective gnoseo-
logical counterpart of an ontological potentia, an element of physical reality
that provides an objective measure of ontologically existent quantum pow-
ers. We believe that the key to disentangle the quantum riddle and create a
coherent representation of quantum physical reality is to abandon the meta-
physical dogma, presupposed in classical physics, that Reality = Actuality.
We should acknowledge in this respect that “common sense” is just a name
for the naturalization of dogmatic metaphysics. Indeed, our time calls to
work on the elaboration of a new idea of reality, but in order not to engage
ourselves in pseudoproblems we should also acknowledge right from the start
that this project is in itself a metaphysical enterprise.
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